No Surprises Here

The tragic deaths of track workers in Wales last year were entirely predictable and avoidable.

Safety inspectors are demanding Network Rail implement “real change” after the death of two track workers in south Wales, saying the underlying causes had been “repeatedly highlighted” by 44 investigations since 2006.

Having been involved in track safety training and assessment for some years prior to retiring from it last year, none of this surprises me in the slightest.

Network Rail has in place a scheme for managing track safety training and assessment. This is overseen by an outside body contracted by Network Rail – the National Skills Academy for Rail Engineering.

On the face of it, this is a sensible scheme as the whole thing is designed to prevent fraudulent access to the track. Yes, back in the bad old days, track safety tickets were being bought and sold in the local pub, so something had to happen, hence the Sentinel scheme.

The problem, however, is that eventually a system can become too top heavy. There then becomes a conflict between getting the job done and the onerous requirements for a safe system of work with its plethora of paperwork. I recall having a ream of paperwork just to do a track safety walkout during training activities, most of which was entirely useless to me. I even had to to a task brief. This consisted of “we are going for a walk to look at the track and show you what’s what.” Yes, really.

As a track safety trainer and assessor, I frequently came across track workers who told me that the requirements simply didn’t happen as laid out by Network Rail because they got in the way of getting the job done and that if they complained they would be out of work.

I recall on one occasion being told by the COSS that I was assessing that the job couldn’t go ahead as we had to cross the line and he had run out of line blocks. I looked up and down the empty line with over a mile sighting in each direction and was baffled. The time to cross was a matter of seconds and there was plenty of time, besides which, basic training covers this, but the safe systems had become so top heavy that they now had to contact the signaller and get a line block. The time taken to do this and complete the paperwork was longer than the time it took to cross, hence signallers were getting annoyed and limiting the blocks they would authorise – after all, they had trains to run.

We all knew this. We all knew something like this would happen. Network Rail set up a system for reporting and actively encourage organisations to have safety reporting in place. They even put in targets to incentivise this, hence at one location we had a safety report against us for a lack of toilet paper in the gents’ toilets. Yes, really. But out on the track? Serious safety issues like the ones highlighted here, that killed track workers? Not so much, it would seem or this would never have happened as there would have been a robust safe system in place. If systems aren’t fit for purpose and are too much effort to put into place, then sloppy practises creep in.

I’m saddened, but not surprised. My heart goes out to those who lost husbands, sons, fathers, brothers. Maybe there will be a change. A proper, sensible change that doesn’t place impossible expectations on the people on the ground. But the cynic in me suspects that there will be another avoidable loss of life sooner or later.